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Abstract
We study the impact of timing and commitment on adaptation and mitigation
policies in the context of international environmental problems. Adaptation policies
present the characteristics of a private good and may require a prior investment, while
mitigation policies produce a public good. In a stylized model, we evaluate the impact
of strategic commitment and leadership considerations when countries with di¤erent
attitudes towards environmental cooperation coexist. We obtain equilibrium abate-
ment and adaptation levels and environmental costs under partial cooperation for var-
ious timing and leadership scenarios. Crucially, global environmental costs su¤ered by
countries are found to be greater when adaptation measures can be used strategically.
Keywords: Adaptation, Climate change, Leadership, Mitigation, Strategy, Tim-
ing.
1 Introduction
One of the consequences of climate change is the increasing frequency of extreme weather
events occurring around the globe. Unusually high rainfall is becoming a signicant cause
of oods, as for example in 2013 in Alberta (Canada) and in Germany, Austria, the Czech
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Republic and France. On the other hand, droughts are becoming longer, harsher and more
frequent, as experienced for instance in 2012 in many U.S. states and in Russia, England
and Wales.
To limit climate change, it has been suggested that countries need both to reduce their
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions substantially and sustainably, and to invest in adaptive
measures (see the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment
Report (2014), the European Commission Climate Action (2015), and President Barack
Obamas 2013 Climate Action Plan). Mitigation policies consist of any means to cut down
GHG emissions, from reducing deforestation and investing in new clean technologies and
renewable energies, to changing consumer behavior; their aim is to prevent the adverse
consequences of climate change by reducing its rate and magnitude. Mitigation policies nd
their roots in the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and in
all the ensuing UN Climate Change Conferences. However, the e¤ectiveness of mitigation
policies is limited by two factors. The rst one, called climate inertia, is intrinsic to the
climate system itself. Climate inertia refers to the long period required to reach a new
climate system equilibrium after the stabilization of the atmospheric concentration of CO2
and other greenhouse gases. The second factor is related to the relatively small number
of countries committed to GHG emissions reduction, and to the limited extent of their
reductions. On the other hand, adaptation policies are designed to alleviate the damages if
the adverse consequences of climate change (oods, droughts, heat waves) should materialize.
Adaptation policies can take many di¤erent forms, such as early warning systems, sea walls,
ood levees, irrigation systems, or the development of new crop varieties adapted to drought
or changes in temperature.
Although adaptation and mitigation policies are both answers to the risks of climate
change, they show some important di¤erences. The rst one is the time scale of their
impact: while adaptation has the potential to reduce the risks of climate change over the
next few decades, mitigation has relatively little inuence on climate outcomes over this time
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scale. The second di¤erence lies in the nature of the investment, where adaptation shows
all the characteristics of a private good (with costs and benets sustained and enjoyed by
the individual country that adopts it), while mitigation presents all the features of a public
good, including the risk of free-riding.
In line with the IPCC Fifth assessment report statement that adaptation and mitigation
are complementary strategies for reducing and managing the risks of climate change(IPCC
(2014), page 76), in this paper, we study countriesdecisions about adaptation and mitiga-
tion expenditures, under di¤erent assumptions on commitment and timing. In particular,
we consider the cases where investments in adaptation measures can be made prior to or
simultaneously with mitigation decisions, and the cases where a group of countries can take
leadership in environmental measures by making prior commitments.
The literature on adaptation (or self-protection) and mitigation (or abatement) has de-
veloped in several directions.1 A rst group of papers analyzes the relationship between
adaptation and mitigation policies, that is, whether and when they are substitutes or com-
plements (see, e.g., Yohe and Strzepek (2007), Lecocq and Shalizi (2007), and Ingham et
al. (2013)). Other authors focus on how the introduction of adaptive measures against cli-
mate change a¤ects the stable size of international environmental agreements (IEA) aimed
at reducing GHG emissions (see, e.g., Barrett (2008), Marrouch and Chaudhuri (2011) and
Buob and Siegenthaler (2011)). A third stream of the literature studies the optimal mix of
mitigation and adaptation policies as responses to the e¤ects of climate change (see, e.g.,
Kane and Shogren (2000), Tulkens and van Steenberghe (2009), Bréchet et al. (2013) and
Farnham and Kennedy (2014)).
Some of these topics have been further developed by explicitly including the timing of
decisions in the problem setting. Papers that clearly mention the timing of investments in
both types of environmental policies and their strategic interactions include De Bruin et
al. (2011), where the level of adaptation is chosen before solving the emissions game in
1For a recent survey please refer to Agrawala et al. (2011).
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the context of evaluating coalition structures in IEA; Buob and Stephan (2011) and Ebert
and Welsch (2012), where adaptation is timed after mitigation in the context of determining
the optimal mix between the two types of investments; Eisenack and Kähler (2012), who
add a leadership structure to the setting of Ebert and Welsch (2012); and Zehaie (2009),
who considers three di¤erent sequences2 in the context of analyzing the impact of di¤erent
strategic commitments to adaptation.
By focusing on the consequences of the timing of adaptive investments with respect to
mitigation decisions, our paper is close in spirit to the one by Zehaie (2009), as we share a
similar research question. However, our setting allows the interaction of cooperators with
non-cooperators (or partial cooperation), which is not possible in a two player model, where
either both players cooperate, or none does. In addition, by specifying functional forms,
we are able to evaluate the consequences of strategic timing on welfare, at both the global
and the individual level. Note that papers that do allow for partial cooperation, namely in
the context of IEA stability issues, do not consider the possibility of di¤erent timing and
commitment scenarios.
The aim of our paper is to study the consequences of di¤erent strategic commitments
to adaptive investments as a complementary strategy to mitigation policies, when countries
have di¤erent attitudes as a response to climate change. In order to do this, we develop a
multiple country model where agents minimize their environmental cost by choosing their
adaptation and mitigation levels, and where a subset of countries, of arbitrary size, cooperate
in order to reduce their joint costs. We consider two types of adaptive investments: the ones
that require some prior commitment (e.g. major investments such as dykes), and the ones
that can be carried out simultaneously with mitigation decisions (e.g. use of more resistant
crop varieties). Furthermore, we examine the case where these cooperating countries become
leaders in environmental policies while the other (individualistic) countries act as followers.
This allows us to contribute to the existing literature in three di¤erent ways. Firstly, we
2Namely, the decision about the adaptation level is made before, after and simultaneously with the
mitigation one, where the last two sequences are shown to be equivalent.
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extend the results on strategic interactions observed in two-country models to a more general
setting with n-countries. Secondly, we derive new strategic interactions arising in the context
of partial cooperation, that is, among players with di¤erent attitudes toward cooperation,
and with di¤erent leadership positions. Finally, we perform a complete comparison, not
only between di¤erent timing of adaptive investments but also between di¤erent coexisting
behaviors, for all the variables involved in the problem (i.e. environmental costs, adaptation
and mitigation levels).
The main results of our paper are the following: regardless of the number of cooperating
countries, a greater environmental cost is su¤ered when countries commit to investments in
adaptive measures before they decide about mitigation measures. When adaptation invest-
ments are made before the mitigation decisions, countries can take advantage of a strategic
e¤ect and increase adaptation to reduce their mitigation e¤ort, which is shown to be globally
ine¢ cient. Finally, leadership in responding to the e¤ects of climate change is not benecial
from an aggregate point of view, but it is convenient for the countries that become leaders.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model; Section 3
computes the equilibrium levels of all variables for the two types of adaptive investments;
prior (Section 3.1) and concurrent (Section 3.2) adaptation. Section 4 performs the same
analysis for the case where cooperating countries take the leadership in responding to climate
change e¤ects. Section 5 compares equilibrium solutions under various settings, and Section
6 draws the main conclusions. Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider n symmetric countries, each of which produces an economic output denoted by
oj. The production activity carried out by a country, in addition to generating economic
value, creates emissions according to the relationship ej = joj, where j is a parameter
related to the cleanliness of the production technologies used by country j. We normalize
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joj = 1 for each j, so that the optimal emissions of each country when there is no environ-
mental concern is equal to 1. Pollution reduces the welfare (e.g., losses in productivity) of
each country, and this reduction is increasing in total GHG emissions, denoted by E.
Countries can respond to the e¤ects of climate change caused by pollution with two
di¤erent environmental policies. The rst one is called adaptation and it consists of in-
vesting in some form of private measures to counteract the consequences of climate change
(dams, diversion canals, irrigation, crop diversication). This policy reduces the countrys
vulnerability to pollution but does not change the pollution level, so that each countrys
environmental vulnerability is given by
vj = E   bj
where bj 2 [0; E] measures the reduction in vulnerability resulting from adaptive measures.
The cost of adaptation for country j is an increasing convex function of bj, assumed quadratic,
that is,
Aj(bj) = A
2
b2j
where A > 0 is the adaptation cost coe¢ cient.
The second environmental policy is called mitigation and it consists of any means aimed
at curtailing a countrys GHG emissions ej (lters, catalytic converters, expanded forests,
etc.). Mitigation is represented by the variable
mj = 1  ej
where mj 2 [0; 1] is the reduction in the countrys emissions with respect to the base level
of 1. The cost of mitigation for country j is an increasing convex function of mj, assumed
quadratic, that is,
Mj(mj) = M
2
m2j
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where M > 0 is the mitigation cost coe¢ cient.
Contrary to self-protective adaptation measures, mitigation has the characteristics of a
public good, so that the total pollution from all countries is given by
E =
nX
j=1
(1 mj) .
The overall environmental cost for a representative country j is thus given by
zj =
E
2
(E   bj)2 + M
2
m2j +
A
2
b2j (1)
where Dj(E; bj) = E2 (E   bj)2 is the monetized value of the environmental damage, increas-
ing and convex in environmental vulnerability, and E > 0 is the environmental sensitivity
coe¢ cient. The objective of a country j is to choose the mitigation and adaptation levels
that minimize the environmental cost zj.
Note that our stylized model includes the three sources of costs commonly used in the
climate change literature, as reported in Tulkens and van Steenberghe (2009): mitigation
(m), adaptation (b) and su¤ering (v = E   b). Moreover, it is consistent with the usual
assumptions about the behavior of these costs:
A0j > 0
A00j  0
M0j < 0
M00j  0
@
@E
Dj > 0; @@bjDj < 0
@2
@E2
Dj > 0; @2@b2jDj  0
@2
@E@bj
Dj = @2@bj@EDj  0;
(2)
as in e.g. Tulkens and van Steenberghe (2009), Zehaie (2009), Ebert and Welsch (2012),
Eisenack and Kähler (2012), and Ingham et al. (2013).3
Note that a numeraire can be chosen so that M = 1 and the total environmental cost is
3Other papers adopting stylized functional forms in the literature use slightly di¤erent assumptions. The
model of Buob and Stephan (2011) is consistent with (2), but uses a Cobb-Douglas formulation for the
playersutility. On the other hand, both Farnham and Kennedy (2015) and Marrouch and Ray Chauduri
(2011) assume that the damage cost is bi-linear, which requires additionnal conditions on parameter values
to ensure that the optimization problems are convex and that marginal costs have the expected signs.
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expressed in terms of the mitigation cost coe¢ cient. In this numeraire, the environmental
sensitivity parameter is !  E
M
> 0. We then use the change of variable aj = !bj for
the adaptation decision variable, where aj is the level of e¤ective adaptation, and the cost
function for a representative country j can then be equivalently expressed, using only two
parameters, as
cj =
!
2
E2   Eaj + 1
2
m2j +

2
a2j (3)
where   M A+E2E > 0 is a parameter accounting for the impact of adaptive measures on
both the adaptation and environmental costs.
The optimization problem for country j is then
min
mj ;aj

cj =
!
2
E2   Eaj + 1
2
m2j +

2
a2j

(4)
with
E =
nX
j=1
(1 mj) = n mj  
X
k 6=j
mk. (5)
Note that ! = A+E
E
> 1, which ensures that the cost function of an individual country,
given the environmental strategies of the other countries, is strictly convex. Notice also that
the restriction bj  E is always satised in equilibrium; if it were not the case, a player could
deviate by choosing b0j = E < bj, thus reducing both his environmental and adaptation costs
without changing his mitigation cost.
Although countries are symmetric with respect to their baseline output and cost parame-
ters, we assume that they do not have the same attitude towards the issue of climate change.
Indeed, we distinguish between two groups of countries. In the rst group, countries agree to
coordinate their environmental policies by minimizing their joint total environmental cost,
and we call them cooperating countries. Cooperating countries jointly decide on both adap-
tation and mitigation levels.4 The second group is made up of countries that establish their
4The alternative assumption that cooperating countries choose their mitigation levels jointly and their
investment in adaptive measures individually is called semi-cooperation in Zehaie (2009).
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environmental policies by minimizing their own individual overall environmental cost, and
we call them individualistic countries. In the sequel, variables pertaining to cooperating
countries are indexed by C, while those pertaining to individualistic countries are indexed
by I. The proportion of cooperating countries is given by p; and the proportion of indi-
vidualistic countries is denoted by q  1   p. The proportion of cooperating countries is
exogenously given and their attitude could be the result of a self-enforcing agreement, or of
any additional features favouring cooperation (e.g. issue linkage, transfers, political reasons,
reputation e¤ects, etc.).
The optimization problem (4)-(5) will be used to compute mitigation and adaptation
levels, both expressed in the form of either reaction functions or equilibrium solutions. To
explicitly distinguish between these various forms, we emphasize reaction functions with
a tilde, e.g. ~mKIj () is the mitigation level of individualistic country j in scenario K as a
function of the decisions taken by the other players, and equilibrium solutions with a hat
or a bar, e.g. mKC () is the equilibrium mitigation strategy in scenario K of cooperating
countries resulting from adaptation decisions taken in a previous stage. Global equilibrium
solutions are unaccented.
To compute the equilibrium solutions, we assume that each players decisions are interior.
The set of parameter values generating interior solutions depends on the number of players
of each type. Notice that the condition
M

1
A
+
1
E

>
1
4
(n  1)2
ensures that solutions are interior for any proportion of cooperating countries, and for all
the scenarios analyzed in the following. This condition amounts to requiring that mitigation
costs are high enough with respect to adaptation and environmental costs.
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3 Types of adaptation
In order to address the strategic role of timing and commitment to environmental policies,
we consider in this section two di¤erent assumptions about the sequence of decisions made
by countries. Under the rst assumption, countries commit to self-protective adaptation
measures before deciding on their mitigation levels; this commitment may be taken for
strategic reasons, or may be due to the fact that adaptation requires a prior investment.
Under the second assumption, there is no prior commitment by countries to adaptation,
which then plays no strategic role since it results in a private good.
3.1 Adaptation as a prior investment
We rst analyze the situation in which adaptation requires a prior investment, and mitigation
decisions are dependent on adaptation choices that have been committed to by players. This
is modelled as a two-stage game solved by backward induction.
3.1.1 Interaction between the two types of countries
Results pertaining to the prior investment case with partial cooperation are indexed by the
superscript PN . Starting from the second stage mitigation game, a representative cooper-
ating country j solves
min
mC

cCj =
!
2
(n  npmC  MI)2   (n  npmC  MI) aCj +
1
2
m2C +

2
a2Cj

whereMI denotes the total mitigation e¤ort of individualistic players and aCj is the adapta-
tion decision of cooperating country j. From the rst-order condition we derive the mitigation
reaction function
~mPNC (MI ; AC) =
n2p!   np!MI   AC
n2p2! + 1
, (6)
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common to cooperating countries, where AC denotes the total adaptation level of all coop-
erating countries. Note that in deriving (6), we do not assume that the adaptation e¤ort
is identical across cooperating countries, and therefore the reaction function represents the
best joint response to any outcome of the rst stage adaptation game, not necessarily in
equilibrium. The mitigation reaction function (6) is negatively sloped with respect to the
individualistic playerslevel of mitigation, which means that if the global mitigation level
of individualistic countries increases, cooperating countries will respond by reducing theirs,
that is, the curtailing of emissions are strategic substitutes between the two types of coun-
tries. The impact of MI is increasing in the the environmental sensitivity parameter !.
The mitigation reaction of cooperating countries (6) is also negatively a¤ected by their total
adaptation expenditures, showing that adaptation and mitigation are strategic substitutes
for cooperating countries: clearly, the greater are their expenditures in adaptation, the less
vulnerable to climate change the countries become and the less they will mitigate. The
impact of AC is decreasing in the environmental sensitivity.
For a representative individualistic country j, the optimization problem to solve is given
by
min
mIj

cIj =
!
2
(n mIj  MC  MI j)2   (n mIj  MC  MI j) aIj + 1
2
m2Ij +

2
a2Ij

where MI j denotes the total mitigation e¤ort by the other individualistic countries and
MC = npmC is the total mitigation e¤ort by the cooperating countries. The corresponding
reaction function is given by
~mPNIj
 
MI j;MC ; aIj

=
! (n MI j  MC)  aIj
! + 1
: (7)
This reaction function presents the same characteristics as (6): an individualistic countrys
mitigation is negatively related to other playersmitigation and to its own adaptation. Si-
multaneously solving (7) for all individualistic countries yields their equilibrium reaction to
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the mitigation decisions of cooperating countries and to the adaptation decisions made in
the rst stage:
m^PNIj
 
MC ; AI j; aIj

=
! (n MC + AI j)  (! (nq   1) + 1) aIj
nq! + 1
(8)
where aIj is the adaptation decision of individualistic country j, and AI j denotes the total
adaptation by the other individualistic countries. As before, this mitigation reaction function
is derived without assuming that individualistic countriesadaptation levels are equal.
The solution of the second-stage mitigation game is the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
given by the simultaneous solution of the reaction functions, that is:
mPNC (AC ; AI) =
n2p!   (nq! + 1)AC + np!AI
n2p2! + nq! + 1
(9)
mPNIj (AC ; AI ; aIj) = !
n+ npAC + AI
n2p2! + nq! + 1
  aIj (10)
where AI is the total adaptation by individualistic countries. Note that the equilibrium
mitigation decisions depend on the investment in adaptation measures from both types of
countries. For cooperating countries, mitigation is a strategic complement to the adaptive
policies of individualistic countries, and a strategic substitute to their joint adaptive actions.
For individualistic countries, mitigation is a strategic complement to the adaptive policies
of all other countries, and strategic substitute to their own adaptation level. For example, if
cooperating countries jointly increase their investment in adaptive measures, this allows them
to decrease their mitigation e¤ort, as they become less vulnerable to the negative impact of
pollution. The same increase in adaptive measures makes the individualistsmitigation task
more di¢ cult, as an increase in emissions from cooperating countries hurts the individualistic
countries, which are forced to give a stronger response in terms of emissions reduction. In the
same way, when an individualistic country unilaterally increases its adaptation investment,
this leads to a decrease in the mitigation e¤ort of that country and to an increase in the
mitigation e¤ort of all the others. This shows how both types of countries, by choosing
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their adaptive measures in the rst stage, can strategically a¤ect the result of the mitigation
game.
The total emissions for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium are given by
EPN (AC ; AI) =
n+ npAC + AI
n2p2! + nq! + 1
, (11)
where it is apparent that an increase in adaptive measures against climate change leads
to an increase in total emissions. Notice that total emissions are negatively related to the
environmental sensitivity parameter !.
In the rst stage, players take into account the Nash equilibrium solutions (9), (10), (11),
and a representative cooperating country computes its investment in adaptation by solving
min
aC

cCj =
!
2
 
EPN (npaC ; AI)
2     EPN (npaC ; AI) aC + 1
2
 
mPNC (npaC ; AI)
2
+

2
a2C

;
where AC = npaC results from symmetry and from the assumption that cooperating country
coordinate their adaptation policies. From the rst-order condition, using
X  n2p2! (12)
Y  nq! (13)
W  X + Y + 1; (14)
we derive the reaction function
~aPNC (AI) =
(X + 1) (Y + 1) (AI + n)
W 2   n2p2 (X   Y 2 + 1) ; (15)
which is positively related to the adaptation e¤ort of individualistic countries, meaning that
preventive actions taken by the countries against the impact of climate change are strategic
complements.
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A representative individualistic country j chooses its adaptation level by solving
min
aIj
n
cIj =
!
2
 
EPN (AC ; AI j + aIj)
2     EPN (AC ; AI j + aIj) aIj
+
1
2
 
mPNIj (AC ; AI j + aIj; aIj)
2
+

2
a2Ij

:
From the rst-order conditions, we nd a similar complementarity in the reaction of indi-
vidualistic countries to the adaptation commitment of other countries, that is,
~aPNI (AC ; AI j) = (! + 1) (W   !)
n+ npAC + AI j
W 2 + (W   !   1)2   !   1
and in the individualistic countries equilibrium reaction to the adaptation commitment of
cooperating countries:
a^PNI (AC) =
n (! + 1) (pAC + 1) (W   !)
W 2 + (W   !   1) (X + 1)  nqW : (16)
The solution of the system (15)-(16) gives the equilibrium solution of the whole game:
aPNC = n
!2 (Y + 1) (X + 1) (X + Y   ! + W )
K1
aPNI = n
! (! + 1) (W   !) (!W +XY )
K1
mPNC = n
2p!2W (!   1) X + Y   ! + W
K1
mPNI = n!W (!   1)
XY + !W
K1
where
K1 = W
3 (!   1)2 +W (Y + 1) (X + 1)
+ (!   1)W (X + 1)  X + 3Y + Y 2 + 2
+! (X + 1) (X + Y   !) ((!   1)W + Y + 1) :
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Claim 1 When the two types of countries interact and adaptive measures are a prior invest-
ment with respect to mitigation decisions, a cooperating country always adapts more than a
individualistic country, and su¤ers a greater environmental cost. When there are more in-
dividualistic countries than cooperating countries, for  small enough, the mitigation level of
cooperating countries is lower than that of individualistic countries.
It is interesting to note that the mitigation level of cooperating countries can be lower than
that of individualistic countries, contrary to the usual result in partial cooperation mitigation
games. Nonetheless, cooperating countries still su¤er a greater cost than individualistic
countries.
To conclude, when adaptation is a prior investment, its impact on subsequent mitigation
decisions, (see Equations (9)-(10)) gives adaptation policies a strategic role, even though
adaptation is a private good.5
3.1.2 Singular type special cases
If we consider the special cases where all players are of the same type, we obtain a general-
ization of the results found in Zehaie (2009) to the n player case.
The rst best solution is obtained by setting p = 1 (all players are cooperators). In this
case, the timing of decisions does not matter and adaptation has no strategic role, as all
countries solve a joint optimization problem. This solution is indexed by the superscript FB
and is given by
aFB =
n
K2
mFB = n2
!   1
K2
where K2 =  + n2 (!   1) .
5Notice that, because of this strategic role, the equilibrium results would be di¤erent if cooperators agreed
to coordinate only their mitigation policies (semi-cooperation).
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By using aFB = !bFB, we nd that Mm
FB = nAb
FB. As noted in Zehaie (2009), in the rst
best solution, mitigation is preferred to adaptation because of its public good characteristics.
The non-cooperative solution with prior commitment is obtained by setting q = 1 (all
players are individualists). This scenario is indexed by the superscript PI and generalizes
the rst non-cooperative case studied in Zehaie (2009) (self-protection before abatement).
As in Zehaie (2009), we nd that mitigation levels are strategic substitutes between players
and, for a given player, adaptation is a strategic substitute to mitigation:
~mPIIj
 
MI j; aIj

=
! (n MI j)  aIj
! + 1
:
With n players, we nd the additional result that the equilibrium mitigation level is posi-
tively related other playersadaptation, and negatively related to own adaptation, and that
adaptation levels are strategic complements between players:
mPIIj (AI j; aIj) =
n! + !AI j   aIj (! (n  1) + 1)
n! + 1
:
~aPII (AI j) = (! + 1) (! (n  1) + 1)
n+ AI j
 (n! + 1)2 + !2 (n  1)2   !   1 :
The equilibrium solution to the n-player non-cooperative game is given by
aPI =
n (! + 1) ( ! + n! + 1)
K3
mPI =
n (!   1) (n! + 1)
K3
where K3 =  (n! + 1)
2   n! (n  1)  !   n.
3.2 Adaptation as a concurrent investment
We now study the case where adaptation and mitigation decisions are made concurrently by
the players.
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3.2.1 Two types of players
Results pertaining to the simultaneous investment case with partial cooperation are indexed
by the superscript SN . When decisions are made concurrently, a representative cooperator
solves
min
mC ;aC

cCj =
!
2
(n  npmC  MI)2   (n  npmC  MI) aC + 1
2
m2C +

2
a2C

yielding the rst-order conditions
8><>: mC =
n2p!
n2p2!+1
  np!
n2p2!+1
MI   npn2p2!+1aC
aC =
n npmC MI

:
By solving the FOCs above we derive the reaction functions of cooperating countries as
~mSNC (MI) =
np (!   1) (n MI)
 + n2p2 (!   1)
~aSNC (MI) =
n MI
 + n2p2 (!   1) :
A representative individualistic country solves the optimization problem
min
mIj ;aIj

cIj =
!
2
(n mIj  MC  MI j)2   (n mIj  MC  MI j) aIj + 1
2
m2Ij +

2
a2Ij

(17)
with rst-order conditions8><>: mIj =
n!
nq!+1
  !
nq!+1
MC   1nq!+1aIj
aIj =
n MC MI

:
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The reaction functions are then
~mSNI (MC) = (n MC)
!   1
 + nq (!   1)
~aSNI (MC) =
n MC
 + nq (!   1) :
By examining the reaction functions of both types of countries, we nd that adaptation
decisions no longer play any strategic role, but, as in the prior-commitment case, mitigation
decisions by the two types of countries are strategic substitutes, and adaptation decisions
are strategic substitutes to the mitigation decisions of the other-type players.
The solution of the whole game is then given by
aSNC = a
SN
I =
n
K4
mSNC =
n2p (!   1)
K4
mSNI =
n (!   1)
K4
where K4 =  + n
 
q + np2

(!   1) :
Claim 2 When the two types of countries interact and adaptation and mitigation are estab-
lished at the same time, cooperators and individualists allocate the same amount of resources
to adaptation, which is proportional to the total emissions. Individualistic countries mitigate
less and su¤er a smaller environmental cost than cooperating countries.
In the concurrent investments case, there is no strategic e¤ect of adaptation policies
between the two groups of countries. The equilibrium result is similar to what is usually
observed in partial cooperation mitigation games: individualistic countries take advantage
of the positive externality generated by cooperators and mitigate less, thus su¤ering a lower
environmental cost.
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3.2.2 Singular type special case
If we consider the special case where all players are individualistic, by setting q = 1 we gen-
eralize the second and third non-cooperative cases studied in Zehaie (2009) (self-protection
simultaneous and after abatement, which are shown to be equivalent) to the n player case.
This scenario is indexed by the superscript SI: The equilibrium solution among the non-
cooperating players is then given by
aSI =
n
K5
mSI =
n (!   1)
K5
where K5 =  + n (!   1) :
As in Zehaie (2009), we nd that Mm
FB = Ab
FB, that is, marginal costs of both environ-
mental measures are equal at equilibrium.
4 Leadership in environmental policies
We consider again the two types of adaptive investments but we now introduce the hypothesis
that cooperating countries act as leaders in both mitigation and adaptation decisions while
individualistic countries behave as followers. Results pertaining to the prior investment case
with leadership are indexed by the superscript PL, while those pertaining to the simultaneous
investment case with leadership are indexed by the superscript SL.
4.1 Adaptation as a prior investment
In this case we assume that countries commit to adaptation before mitigation, and that
cooperating countries act as leaders, both for adaptation and mitigation decisions. We
model this situation as a two-stage Stackelberg game and we solve it by backward induction
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starting from the second stage, where a representative individualistic country chooses its
mitigation level by minimizing
min
mIj

cIj =
!
2
(n mIj  MC  MI j)2   (n mIj  MC  MI j) aIj + 1
2
m2Ij +

2
a2Ij

.
As in Section 3.1, Equation (8), the equilibrium reaction function of individualistic counties
is given by
m^PLIj
 
MC ; AI j; aIj

=
! (n MC + AI j)  (! (nq   1) + 1) aIj
nq! + 1
,
and the equilibrium total mitigation by individualistic countries is then
M^PLI (MC ; AI) =
n2q!   nq!MC   AI
nq! + 1
.
A representative cooperating country, acting as a leader, anticipates the followersreaction
function and, in its second-stage mitigation game, solves
min
mC

cCj =
!
2

n  npmC   M^PLI (npmC ; AI)
2
 

n  npmC   M^PLI (npmC ; AI)

aCj +
1
2
m2C +

2
a2Cj

.
Its best response to the adaptation levels determined in the rst stage is given by
~mPLC (AC ; AI) =
n2p!   AC (nq! + 1) + np!AI
n2p2! + (nq! + 1)2
,
and presents similar features as in the case without leadership.
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The subgame-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium in mitigation is given by
mPLC (AC ; AI) =
n2p!   (nq! + 1)AC + np!AI
n2p2! + (nq! + 1)2
mPLIj (AC ; AI ; aIj) =
(nq! + 1)n! + np!AC + (nq! + 1)!AI
n2p2! + (nq! + 1)2
  aIj (18)
and the corresponding total emissions are given by
EPL (AC ; AI) =
n (nq! + 1) + npAC + (nq! + 1)AI
n2p2! + (nq! + 1)2
. (19)
We observe that, as in the case without leadership, adaptation as a prior investment can
be used strategically to inuence a countrys mitigation policies. Again, the emissions of
cooperating players are positively related to the adaptation levels of individualistic countries,
and negatively related to their joint adaptation level, while the emissions of individualistic
players are positively related to the adaptation levels of all other countries, but negatively
related to their own adaptation level.
Moving to the rst stage of the sequential game, the equilibrium mitigation levels (18)
and (19) are taken into account by each individualistic country, which selects its investment
in adaptive measures by solving
min
aIj

cIj =
!
2
 
EPL (AC ; AI)
2     EPL (AC ; AI) aIj + 1
2
 
mPLIj (AC ; AI ; aIj)
2
+

2
a2Ij

;
which yields the equilibrium response function
a^PLI (AC) = n
(! + 1)
 
X + (Y + 1)2   ! (Y + 1) (Y + pAC + 1) 
X + (Y + 1)2
  

 
X + (Y + 1)2
  nq (Y + 1)+ (X + (Y + 1) (Y   !))W
where constants X; Y andW are dened in (12)-(14). If cooperating countries increase their
expenditures on adaptive measures, individualistic countries react by doing the same.
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We then have
~EPL (AC) =
(n2! (Y + 1) +XAC) (U + G)
Hn
~mPLC (AC) = p
AC (G (Y   ! (Y + 1))  !U) + n2!2 (U + G)
H
~mPLI (AC) =
(H +W (! + 1) (! (Y + 1) G)) (XAC + n2! (Y + 1))
GHn
where
H = !G2 + !WU   Y G (Y + 1)
U = X + (Y + 1) (Y   !)
G = (Y + 1)2 +X:
Finally, cooperating countries solve the optimization problem
min
aC

cCj =
!
2

~EPL (npaC)
2
 

~EPL (npaC)

aC +
1
2
 
~mPLC (npaC)
2
+

2
a2C

and the solution of the whole game is then
aPLC =
n!2 (U + G) ((Y + 1)H  XY (G+ !U))
K5
aPLI =
n! (! + 1) (XY (G+ !U)  ! (Y + 1)H) (! (Y + 1) G)
K5
mPLC = n
2p!2 (U + G)
 !UW + Y G (Y + 1) + ! (H  G2)
K5
mPLI = n!
(H +W (! + 1) (! (Y + 1) G)) (!H (Y + 1) XY (G+ !U))
K5G
where
K5 =
 
!
 
H2   !XG3+X  !2U2 (X + 1) + Y 2G2   2!U (H + Y G) :
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Claim 3 When cooperating countries act as leaders and adaptation is a prior investment, a
cooperating country adapts always less than an individualistic country. When their number
is small enough, cooperators mitigate less than individualists, and therefore their total cost
is lower than that of the individualistic countries.
Notice that when cooperating countries are leaders, the relationship holding between the
adaptive investments of cooperators and individualists is opposite to what is found with
prior adaptive investments without leadership.
4.2 Adaptation as a concurrent investment
In this section adaptation and mitigation are decided on at the same time; however, indi-
vidualistic countrieschoices for both policies are anticipated by cooperating players. The
reaction of an individualistic country to a joint announcement by the leaders is obtained by
solving (17), which yields
~mSLI (MC) =
(!   1) (n MC)
 + nq (!   1)
~aSLI (MC) =
n MC
 + nq (!   1) .
It is important to highlight that, as in the game without leadership, individualistsmitigation
choices are not a¤ected by what is announced by the leaders in terms of their adaptation
policy. Even when cooperating countries are leaders, adaptation has no strategic e¤ect
on individualistsdecisions. Individualistic countries optimal adaptation expenditures are
still a proportion of total emissions. However, if leaders declare that they will increase
their mitigation levels, followers will respond by reducing their e¤ort in both environmental
policies.
These reactions are anticipated by the cooperating countries, whose optimization problem
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is given by
min
mC ;aC

cCj =
!
2
 
n  npmC   nq ~mSLI (npmC)
2    n  npmC   nq ~mSLI (npmC) aC + 12m2C + 2a2C

yielding
aSLC = n
 + nq (!   1)
 ((nq! + 1) ( (nq! + 1)  2nq) + n2p2 (!   1)) + n2q2
mSLC =
n2p (!   1)
2
 
n2p2! + (nq! + 1)2
  n (2q (nq! + 1) + np2) + n2q2 :
The solution of the whole game is:
aSLC = a
SL
I = n
 + nq (!   1)
K6
mSLC =
n2p (!   1)
K6
mSLI =
n (   nq + nq!) (!   1)
K6
where K6 = 
 
(nq! + 1) ( (nq! + 1)  2nq) + n2p2 (!   1)+ n2q2:
Claim 4 When cooperating countries act as leaders and adaptation and mitigation are si-
multaneous decisions, both types of countries behave in the same way in terms of adaptation.
When the number of cooperating countries is small enough, both their mitigation levels and
their total cost are lower than that of individualistic countries.
For concurrent investments under leadership, adaptation levels of both types of players
are equal, as in the no-leadership case. However, when the number of cooperating leaders is
small, individualists are no longer able to free ride and to mitigate less than the others.
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5 Results
In this section we assess the impact of commitment and timing of adaptive investments. We
focus, in particular, on three di¤erent variables, namely, the performances of countries in
terms of environmental cost and their level of adaptation and mitigation.
The rst set of results provides an evaluation of the two types of adaptive investments for
the singular-type cases; this completes and extends Zehaie (2009)s result about the ranking
of adaptation levels in these cases.
Claim 5 When all players are individualists and adaptive measures are a prior investment,
then countries:
(a) su¤er a greater environmental cost;
(b) achieve a greater level of adaptation;
(c) mitigate less
than when adaptation and mitigation are decided simultaneously. Moreover, for both
types of adaptive investments, the environmental costs and the adaptation levels are higher,
whereas the mitigation levels are lower than in the rst best solution.
When all countries act individualistically and investments in adaptation are decided on
before mitigation levels, countries su¤er the highest environmental cost. This is due to the
fact that countries use their investments in self-protective measures strategically, so that,
by reducing their vulnerability to climate change e¤ects, they can mitigate less. A better
option in terms of environmental cost is to carry out adaptation and mitigation e¤orts
simultaneously, which implies smaller adaptive expenditures and a greater mitigation e¤ort.
We now turn to the mixed cases involving both cooperators and individualists. Thanks
to the presence of coexisting behaviors, we can confront the results between the two types
of countries and highlight new insights against the singular type cases.
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The second set of ndings compares the equilibrium solutions found in Section 3 (no
leadership) with the rst best solution.
Claim 6 Regardless of the type of adaptive investment:
(a) in terms of costs, cooperating countries are never able to outperform the rst best
solution, but individualistic countries can outperform the rst best solution when there
is a relatively large number of cooperating countries;
(b) both individualistic and cooperating countries adaptive levels are higher than in the
rst best solution;
(c) individualistic countries always mitigate less than in the rst best solution, but cooperat-
ing countries may curtail their emissions more when mitigation is relatively expensive.
The rst observation (a) is due to the presence of coexisting behaviors. Cooperators
choose aggressive environmental policies that allow individualistic countries to free ride, so
that they can be in a better position than in the rst best solution when the number of
cooperating countries is high enough. It is worthy of note that this free-riding advantage
exists for both types of adaptive investment. The third observation (c) about the mitigation
levels is an interesting result since cooperators always adapt more than in the rst best
solution; however, due to the coexistence with individualistic countries, cooperators are led
to ine¢ ciently high levels of emission reduction, even though their adaptation investment is
high.
The third set of results compares the individual solutions of cooperators versus individ-
ualists found in Section 3 (no leadership) under the two di¤erent timing scenarios.
Claim 7 When adaptive measures are a prior investment:
(a) both types of countries su¤er a greater environmental cost;
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(b) both types of countries achieve a greater level of adaptation;
(c) cooperating countries always mitigate less, but it can happen that individualistic coun-
tries mitigate more
than when adaptation and mitigation decisions are taken simultaneously.
The rst observation (a) is interesting, as it conrms Claim 5 for the partial cooperation
case: prior commitment to adaptive measures is not welfare enhancing. This ine¢ ciency is
again due to the strategic e¤ect of adaptive measures: players choose adaptive levels that
are too high in order to inuence the equilibrium mitigation levels in the second stage. For
cooperating countries, this translates in lower mitigation levels, an expected result because
of the substitution e¤ect between mitigation and adaptation. However, for individualistic
countries, we can show that they do not take advantage of this substitution e¤ect when the
environmental sensitivity is relatively high.
When we repeat the same types of analysis under the assumption that cooperating coun-
tries become leaders in responding to climate change while individualistic countries act as
followers, most of the previously reported comparisons become ambiguous. Clear conclusions
can only be drawn when comparing the equilibrium solutions with and without leadership
under the assumption that adaptation and mitigation decisions are taken simultaneously.
Claim 8 When adaptation and mitigation decisions are taken simultaneously and cooperat-
ing countries act as leaders:
(a) the environmental cost is lower for cooperating countries, higher for individualistic
countries, but the overall aggregate cost is greater;
(b) both types of countries adapt more;
(c) cooperating countries mitigate less, individualistic countries mitigate more, but total
pollution level is higher
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than in a game without leadership.
Cooperating countries, by becoming rst movers and anticipating the followersreaction,
mitigate less and push the followers to mitigate more than in a game without leadership.
This yields a higher total pollution, and greater expenditures in adaptation for both types of
countries, since adaptation is proportional to the total pollution level. In terms of individual
performance, leaders are better o¤, and followers are worse o¤, but at the aggregate level, the
overall environmental cost is greater with leadership than without leadership, implying that
leadership is not globally e¢ cient.6 This observation is in line with the outcome of the Paris
climate change agreement adopted in December 2015 by more than 190 countries. In the
Paris agreement, there are no references to any historical responsibilitiesor to Annex
and non-Annexcountries, even if the concept of di¤erentiation is still present across all
the elements of the agreement (e.g. mitigation, adaptation, nance, technology, capacity
building and transparency).
To conclude this section, it is worth mentioning that adaptation as a prior investment
yields the worst aggregate outcome in all the scenarios analyzed here (non-cooperation, par-
tial cooperation, and leadership)7. This is an important result, as it qualies the statement,
in the IPCC (2014), that adaptation and mitigation are complementary strategies for re-
ducing the risks of climate change; according to our model, to achieve more e¢ cient results,
these strategies should be decided on simultaneously.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we developed a model where countries minimize their environmental cost by
adopting two environmental policies, namely, mitigation and adaptation, with the objective
6However, it would be convenient for a group of collaborating countries to make the rst move and become
leaders.
7Numerical investigations show that, under leadership, prior investment is ine¢ cient at the aggregate
level, even if it may happen that leaders su¤er a lower cost than in the concurrent investment case.
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of understanding the implications of di¤erent decision sequences for these policies, when
players di¤er in their cooperative behavior.
We found that adaptation can be used strategically, that is, by committing to adaptive
measures before deciding on mitigation levels, countries can allocate greater resources to
adaptation and self-protection (a private good) in order to reduce their contribution to
public mitigation e¤orts.
One of the main results of our analysis is that the highest environmental cost su¤ered
by countries always occurs when investments in adaptation are committed to before any
decisions about mitigation levels are made (this is true both in the fully non-cooperative
case and in the partial cooperation case, with and without leadership). As a consequence,
simultaneous investments in adaptive and mitigating measures seem to be the best way to
answer the problem of the e¤ects of climate change. This is an important result because
it reinforces the message stated in the IPCC (2014), while adding that the complementary
environmental policies should be carried out at the same time, with a unied approach.
Finally, we showed that with simultaneous investments in adaptive and mitigating mea-
sures, having some countries taking leadership in responding to the e¤ects of climate change
is not benecial at an aggregate level. This contrasts with what has been done for the promo-
tion of international environmental agreements in the Kyoto Protocol, that is the distinction
between Annexand No-Annexcountries. Our result is more in line with the approach
adopted in the new climate change agreement signed in Paris in December 2015 by over 190
countries and meant to replace the Kyoto Protocol in 2020. In the new agreement, there
is no mention to any "historical responsibilities" even if the idea of di¤erentiated countries
is mentioned across all the elements of the agreement. However, from an individual point
of view, countries that become leaders are able to lower their overall cost, so that it is in
the interest of cooperating countries to take a rst step in countering the e¤ects of climate
change.
As a nal remark, notice that in this paper the number of countries having a coopera-
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tive behaviour is an exogenous parameter, and, as a consequence, our results apply to any
number of cooperators. The question of stability of an eventual agreement between these
cooperating countries is not addressed and this is one limitation of the paper, as all the
possible congurations we consider would not necessarily correspond to a stable coalition.
An interesting avenue for future research would be to determine to what extent the timing of
adaptation activities could impact the incentives for countries to participate in self-enforcing
or in cooperative agreements.
7 Appendix
In the following proofs, we use the auxiliary variables k  !   1 > 0 and X; Y and W as
dened in (12)-(14) to simplify the notation.
Claim 1. aPNC > a
PN
I :
K1
aPNC   aPNI
n!
= kW (Y   !) (X   !) > 0:
mPNC ? mPNI :
K1
mPNC  mPNI
kn!W
= !W (np  1) XY + np! (X + Y   !) :
This di¤erence is negative if
0 <  <
XY   np! (X + Y   !)
!W (np  1) = np!
nq   1  np
W
;
which requires that nq   1 > np (more defectors than cooperators).
cPNC > c
PN
I :
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2K21
cPNC   cPNI
n2k2W! (X   !) = kW
 
kW 2 + !
 
2X + !2 + Y 2 +X (2X   !) + 2Y (X   !)
+ (! + 1) (X + 1)
 
(Y   !) (3Y +X! + 1) + Y 2 (X   2!)
+kW
 
4 (X + Y +XY ) +X
 
2X + Y 2

+ 2
 
Y 2 + 1

+!2 (X + 1)
 
(! + 1) (Y + 1) +X2

+ (X + 1)
 
2 (X + Y ) + Y
 
3X + Y 2

+X2 + 1

+ (X + 1)
 
!
 
2 (X + Y ) + Y
 
6X + Y 2

+ 2X2 + 1

> 0:
Claim 2. mSNC > m
SN
I :
K4
 
mSNC  mSNI

= nk (np  1) > 0:
Total cost is higher for cooperating countries since the abatement and environmental costs
are equal for both types of countries.
Claim 3. aPLC < a
PL
I
K5
aPLC   aPLI
kn!
=  G2U! (Y + 1) k   U!W (G+ U!) (Y + 1) GXY (G+ U!) < 0:
Numerical investigations show that mitigation levels and total costs di¤erences can be
positive or negative. For mitigation levels, mPLC  mPLI when
np  (H +W (! + 1) (! (Y + 1) G)) (!H (Y + 1) XY (G+ !U))
(U + G) ( !UW + Y G (Y + 1) + ! (H  G2))G! :
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Claim 4. mSLC ? mSLI :
!K6
mSLC  mSLI
kn
= k (np  nq!   1) + np  1
Since adaptation levels are the same for the two types of countries, both mSLC < m
SL
I and
cSLC < c
SL
I hold when
np < 1 +
k
k + 1
nq!:
Claim 5.
(a) cPI > cSI > cFB :
2K23K
2
5
cPI   cSI
k2n2 (n  1)2 = k (! + 2) (n! + 1)
2 + (! + 1) (! (2n  1) + 2) > 0
2!K2K
2
5
cSI   cBF
kn2
= k (n  1)2 (k + 1) > 0:
(b) aPI > aSI > aFB :
K3K5
 
aPI   aSI = nk! (n  1) (n! + 1) > 0
K2K5
aSI   aBF
n
= kn (n  1) :
(c) mPI < mSI < mFB :
K3K5
mPI  mSI
kn
=  ! (n  1) < 0
K2K5
mSI  mBF
kn
=   (n  1) k + 1
!
< 0:
Claim 6.
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(a) cSNC > c
FB :
2!K2K
2
4
cSNC   cFB
k2n3
= knq! (np  1) (q + np (p+ 1)) + q (n+ np  2) (k + 1) > 0:
cFB > cPNC ; c
FB ? cSNI and cFB ? cPNI were checked numerically. For instance, for
n = 100; np = 60; ! = 0:4 and  = 4, the cost of the individualist countries is smaller
than in the rst best solution for both types of adaptation.
(b) aFB < aSNC = a
SN
I is immediate since K4 =  + n ((1  p) + np2) k <  + kn2 = K2: We
already showed that aPNI < a
PN
C : a
FB < aPNI was checked numerically.
(c) mFB > mSNI : this is immediate from K4 < K2.
mFB > mPNI was checked numerically.
mFB ? mPNC : for di¤erent set of parameters, we obtained both signs for the di¤erence
mFB  mPNC and mFB  mSNC . The mitigation level of cooperating countries is higher
than in the rst best solution when the mitigation cost coe¢ cient M is large compared
to the environmental sensitivity D.
Claim 7.
(a) cPNC > c
SN
C and c
PN
I > c
SN
I were checked numerically.
(b) aPNC > a
PN
I > a
SN
I = a
SN
C : we already proved that a
PN
C > a
PN
I .
K1K4
aPNI   aSNI
n
= k!W (X + Y   !) (Y + kW +XY + 1) +X2Y kW > 0:
(c) mPNC < m
SN
C :
K1K4
mPNC  mSNC
kn2p
=  Y kW!  ! (nq   1)  n2p2   1+ n2p2 XY (! + 1) (W   !) < 0
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mPNI ? mSNI :
K1K4
mPNI  mSNI
kn!2
= kW
 
n2p2! (np  1) (np+ 1) (nq   1)
   n2p2! + 1 (nq! + 1)  n2p2 + nq   1  kW  n2p2 + nq   1 :
mPNI > m
SN
I if both these conditions are satised:
! >
n2p2 + nq   1
n2p2 (np  1) (np+ 1) (nq   1) > 0
(!   1) > (n
2p2! + 1) (nq! + 1) (n2p2 + nq   1)
W (n2p2! (np  1) (np+ 1) (nq   1)  (n2p2 + nq   1)) > 0:
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